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Despite the stated desire of US President George W. Bush’s administration toOriginal Link
democratize occupied Iraq and other nations in the Middle East, a long-term commitment to transforming the political perspectives of the region and introducing democracy have never been a pillar of US foreign policy, and it is hard to imagine they will become one.
Aside from the fact that democracy has almost never been imposed from outside, the Bush administration does not seek democracy in the Middle East, but rather agreement with its policies. There is a large gap between the rhetoric of democratization to justify American policies and actual US behavior directed at supporting authoritarian regimes. Washington prefers dealing with ruling figures, families or tribes in the region, and the predictability they represent, to getting involved in the domestic and foreign policy complexities inherent in democratic government. One recalls how the US spluttered when Turkey’s Parliament voted to deny American soldiers access to Iraq before the war there.
Supporting democracy requires understanding and dialogue. However, the Bush administration has usually talked the language of power, even with its allies. The establishment of regional democracies must also be linked to fair international trade policies. It is ironic, then, that the most populous Middle Eastern state, Iran, which has made genuine strides toward representative government, is also under the greatest burden of US trade sanctions.
The US has funded projects and programs to enhance economic development, education and civil society. However, can such efforts really be regarded as preconditions for successful democracies in the region? If anything, Arab civil societies that benefit from American funds are often very hostile to the US. In fact, projects funded by the US Agency for International Development or the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as such programs as the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the like, are aimed at achieving objectives different than democratization. While there are many in these organizations or initiatives who would like to push much harder for political change, they are often in no position to go beyond the limits set by senior policy-makers and top-level bureaucrats.
Doubt is also in order when looking at past US behavior. American administrations have usually undermined democratic movements in the region, for example ousting Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. They have sought the paradox of “democracy without democrats.” Washington has long understood that democratic movements in the Middle East would not be pro-American. Consequently, the United States would have never enjoyed under democratic regimes the support it has in the region, with all the ensuing advantages, such as military bases.
The low credibility of the US in the Middle East is a significant obstacle to real engagement for democratization from abroad, if that were possible. Even elites in the region cannot seem to trust American intentions. At the same time, the US is not ready to advance democratization because this might empower Islamist groups. That’s why, for example, Washington sided with the Algerian government in 1991, when elections were “canceled” because of the possibility of an Islamist victory.
Developing democracy would be more effective by teaching people in the region real democratic notions. Yet has anyone heard about recent US support for education in the Middle East? The establishment of American universities in Cairo and Beirut belong to a different, earlier, paradigm of US foreign policy. Meanwhile, the US has done nothing about the millions of children with no access to education, or who depend on Muslim madrassas for part of their daily nutritional needs.
Nobody in Washington today talks about constitutional and judicial reforms in the Middle East, or resort to civil society institutions. Yet gradual democratization is impossible without such reform. Nor has America displayed a clear vision of which kind of democracy it would like to see in the region. Would it be direct democracy, “guided democracy,” liberal democracy, “religious democracy,” or something else?
At the end of the day, the US wants to sell one idea to the American public, namely that Israel is the only democratic state in the Middle East, which justifies American favoritism toward it. This is an essential part of the neoconservative strategy, which has sought to reshape the region in line with Israel’s perceived ideological and material needs.
