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The recent reports that Ayatollah Ali Sistani was playing a central role in defining how a future Iraqi government and constitution would be chosen highlighted once again the profound importance, and paradoxes, of the Shiite clergy in Iraq and Iran. Although Shiites are a minority in the Muslim world and are scattered all over the Middle East and Indian subcontinent, they are a majority in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Shiite seminaries and religious sites are mostly located in Iraq and Iran, and two religious strongholds Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran provide an insight into the dynamics of modern Shiism.
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Najaf and Qom are sites of religious study and pilgrimage, and they export preachers and prayer-leaders to Shiite communities all over the world. They also reflect the interconnections and schisms of Shiites of different nationalities and ethnicities, and represent two different readings and outlooks on religion and religiosity.
Despite common characteristics such as openness, diversity and traditionalism, the two schools of Shiite jurisprudence and thinking differ in many respects. Seminary students and graduates from Qom have been much more politically motivated and engaged during the 20th century. Since its adoption of Shiism under the Safavids in the early 16th century, Iranian society has allowed the clergy a gradually increasing role in the managing of its affairs, culminating in the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iraqi Shiites, on the other hand, have no similar history of continuous political activism on the part of their religious establishment.
The theory of Velayat-e Faqih (or guardianship of the jurisconsult) has its roots in the Qom school, although it was first developed in Najaf by Mullah Ahmad Naraaqi. While the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was a major proponent of the concept, spent much of his exile in Najaf, only a few clerics there attended his sessions on Islamic statehood. During this period he was, in fact, isolated with respect to his ideas about the relationship between religion and politics. The reason Khomeini was exiled to Iraq was that it was hoped he would become de-politicized in the apolitical atmosphere of Najaf. Clerics close to Iran’s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi rejected Khomeini’s theory of Velayat-e Faqih because it endorsed the exercise of temporal authority by religious leaders.
During the 20th century, most Iranian politicians with a clerical background, as well as prominent figures in Shiite political thought, graduated from Qom, where several different approaches to politics and activism were developed. In contrast, while high-ranking Najaf clerics have issued some religious decrees, or fatwas, in general the issuing of political fatwas and activism have not been a tradition in the Iraqi school.
Clerics who graduated from Qom have also tended to be more culturally engaged than those from Najaf. The political and financial structure of Iranian society has helped scholars and students from Qom to pay more attention to broad aspects of society not directly connected with worship. They continue to follow the development of Western thought and culture in Iranian intellectual circles and the public sphere. Many write articles, publish in journals, write film critiques and even, like President Mohammad Khatami, go to musical events.
Another much more dynamic element is the Qom school’s way of using ijtihad, the striving to find God’s order in cases related to daily life. Because Iranian clerics are more engaged in the ordinary life of different social strata, they can address issues that clerics in Iraq are not exposed to. They are also more open to Western philosophy, often studying Aristotle, Plato, and modern philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein and Popper. Qom graduates are also more accepting of modern legal culture, while most of the judges in the Iranian judiciary who regularly oppose constitutional, civil and human rights, graduated from Najaf.
Najaf suffered greatly at the hands of Iraq’s former Baath regime and its seminary was closed down on several occasions. It’s counterpart in Qom, however, has never been closed, even under the despotic regime of the shah. This made Najaf’s seminary vulnerable, a bad situation compounded by the Iraqi Shiite clergy’s historical and intrinsic inability to address cultural and political issues, weakening their ability to respond to political challenges.
Recently, however, scholars from Qom have been losing influence in the Shiite world. Their more open-minded approach has not fit in well with the compulsory Islamization of Iranian society. While Najaf-trained conservatives may not be as engaged in modern cultural and political issues, they continue to dominate the Iranian system, and remain resolute protectors of the tenets of traditional Shiite faith.
Majid Mohammadi
Department of Sociology
Ward Melville Social & Behavioral Sciences Building
SUNY-Stony Brook
